▪ KFSC MACRO INTELLIGENCE COMMENTARY · JULY 2026
Created, Moved, or Earned: The Money Behind the Market
A Liquidity and Valuation Read, July 2026
Two assets, two different engines
We want to show you under the hood.
Gold and S&P 500 (total return including dividends): December 31, 2019, to July 23, 2026, close. [4][5]
Since the eve of COVID, gold has risen more than the stock market. Since the end of 2019, gold is up about +167%; the S&P 500, with dividends reinvested, is up around +153%.[4][5] Both are large gains. But they were driven by two different engines, and they are held for two different reasons: a stock is a claim on a company’s future earnings, while gold earns nothing and is bought when confidence in money and debt weakens. The comparison depends on the starting line. Measured from the panic low of March 2020 instead of the eve of it, stocks come out well ahead. Both facts are true; together they show the two assets have led at different times, and that no single starting point tells the whole story.
Within the KFSC Risk Managed Strategies, our advisors have currently de-risked from equities, meaning the strategies carry less stock-market risk than they would in calmer conditions, and gold is held for its long-term and structural role. That is a statement of current positioning, not a personal recommendation to buy, sell, or hold anything; positioning depends on the risk option you selected, from Preservation of Capital to Aggressive Growth, and may change at any time at your advisor’s discretion. This commentary shows part of the reasoning. Our opinion, stated plainly: the market is priced as if very little can go wrong, priced for perfection. That view comes from our KFSC Macro Intelligence work, which weighs far more inputs than one commentary can show. The six gauges below are a sample of what the model is watching, chosen because every number on them is public and checkable. When investments are moving, it is easy to mistake a higher price for higher future value. The gauges separate what you are paying from what you are getting, and they show which readings are good, which are normal, and which have our attention.
The year so far, on the scoreboard
An above-average year, not a runaway one.
Total return includes dividends. S&P 500 and equal-weight year-to-date both run from December 31, 2025, to the July 23, 2026, close. [4]
Through the July 23 close, the S&P 500 has returned +8.9% for the year, including dividends; the equal-weight version of the same 500 stocks stood at +10.6% through the same close.[4] Against the last two decades of mid-July checkpoints, that is an above-average year, not an extreme one: measured on monthly index data since 2004, 2026 ranked sixth of the last 22 years at mid-July.[3]
The rest of the tape agrees with that temperament. Gold is down 6.2% for the year through the July 23 close, the dollar index is up 3.2%, and the yen and Swiss franc have both weakened against the dollar.[5] Money has been choosing risk, not hiding from it. The gauges measure what that risk now costs.
Gauge 1: The price of the market
What you pay today for a dollar of long-run earnings.
Shiller PE: index price divided by ten years of inflation-adjusted earnings. Percentiles computed from the full monthly series, January 1970 to July 20, 2026. Gold needle: the reading one year ago. [1]
What it is: the price of the market divided by ten years of its real earnings, the slowest, calmest valuation measure in common use. Why it matters: It says what an investor pays today for each dollar of demonstrated earning power. Good looks like a reading near or below its typical range; normal is the gold typical band; what has our attention is a reading seen before only in the months around 2000.
Today, the Shiller PE stands at 41.1, higher than 97.1% of all months since 1970 and nearly double the half-century median of 21.3. The only months at or above it belong to 1999, 2000, and this year.[1] The one-year PE, which measures the same price against just the latest year of earnings, reads 28.5: above its own median of 18.7 and higher than 89.6% of months since 1970, elevated though less extreme.[1]
Fair balance: this dial has read hot for much of the past decade without saying anything about timing, and earnings have so far kept growing underneath it. A high reading is a description of price, not a schedule of events. History for context, not a prediction.
Gauge 2: The market vs. the economy
The value of every listed company is measured against the country’s output.
Total US market capitalization as a percent of GDP, monthly, 1970 to July 20, 2026. Gold needle: the reading one year ago. [2]
What it is: the combined value of the US stock market divided by the size of the US economy. Why it matters: Over long stretches, corporate value and national output tend to move together; this dial shows how far apart they currently are. Good is the two moving in step. What we see now: the market is valued at 234% of GDP, a reading higher than 99.6% of all months since 1970 and nearly three times the series median of 81%. The variant that adds the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet to the denominator reads 193%, a lower number in the same top slice of its own history.[2]
The honest counterpoint: today’s companies earn more of their profits abroad and carry more intangible value than the companies of 1980, so some drift upward in this ratio may be earned rather than excess. The dial cannot separate the two; it can only show that, measured this way, the gap between market and economy has no precedent in the series. History for context, not a prediction.
Gauge 3: Participation
Is the average stock in the race, or are a few giants carrying the index?
Equal-weight S&P 500 total return minus cap-weight, year to date through July 23, is placed against the same late-July gap in each year 2017 through 2026. [4]
What it is: the same 500 stocks weighed two ways: one where the largest member counts hundreds of times more than the smallest, the other where every company counts equally. The gap between them measures whether returns are broad or narrow. Good is the average stock keeping pace or leading. Concerning is a market carried by a handful of names.
This year, the reading is good: the equal-weight index is ahead at the July 23 checkpoint, +10.6% versus +8.9%, a lead of 1.7 points, wider at this point of the year than in eight of the ten years since 2017.[4] For scale, the normal late-July reading over those ten years has been the giants ahead by about 2.3 points, so a year where the average stock leads is the less common shape.[4] The concentration story is real, but it is the decade’s story, not this year’s: over the ten years through July 23, the cap-weighted index returned +302.7% against +152.7% for the equal-weight.[4]
Both things are true at once. In 2026, participation is broad, which is what a healthier market looks like from the inside. And any cap-weighted index fund still carries the concentration built up over ten years. The first describes this year. The second is what a decade builds, and it does not reset in one good year. History for context, not a prediction.
Gauge 4: What insiders are doing
The people who see the books are voting with their own money.
Monthly ratio of corporate insider buy transactions to sell transactions, US-listed companies, January 2004 to July 2026. [3]
What it is: for every insider sale, how many insider purchases occurred that month. Why it matters: executives and directors sell for many reasons, including diversification, taxes, and planned programs, but they generally buy for only one. Normal is the series median of 0.34 buys per sell. What we see now: 0.22, a stronger lean toward selling than 85% of months since 2004, though well above the series low of 0.12.[3]
This dial leans cautious without being extreme, and it has spent long stretches near these levels while prices rose. We treat it as one input among many. History for context, not a prediction.
Gauge 5: The cost of money
What the world charges the United States to borrow for ten years.
US 10-year Treasury benchmark yield, daily closes, 1968 to July 23, 2026. [5]
What it is: the 10-year Treasury yield, the price of long money, and the rate every other asset is ultimately measured against. What we see now: around 4.67% at the July 23 close, up about 0.5 points this year.[5] Against the full sweep since 1968, a history that includes the double-digit yields of the early 1980s, today sits near the 41st percentile, below the six-decade median of 5.74%: ordinary. Against the decade most investors’ instincts were trained in, it is another matter: above every daily close of the 2010s, whose highest reading was 3.99%.[5]
This is the dial that determines the valuation gauges’ weights. Record-percentile prices were easier to justify when money cost nothing. Today’s prices coexist with a cost of money the 2010s never charged, and that combination, not either reading alone, is the tension our advisors watch.
Gauge 6: Money growth
Is the water level rising fast, falling, or just normal?
M2 money supply, year-over-year growth, monthly, 1959 to May 2026. Latest observation May 2026. [6]
What it is: the growth of M2, the cash, checking, and savings that the economy floats on. Why it matters: Rapid money growth has historically accompanied rising prices for goods and for assets; shrinking money has accompanied stress. What we see now: +5.6% a year, the 34th percentile of all growth readings since 1960, and below the long-run median of +6.6%: normal.[6]
The path behind that number tells the decade’s story: M2 expanded 41% between February 2020 and its 2022 peak, then contracted 4.8% in its first sustained decline in decades, and climbed back above its old peak in May 2025.[6] The expansion was the creation of money in 2020–21. What funds the market and the government now have have changed.
Who is paying for it all
Every dollar in markets was created or moved from somewhere else.
Window: October 1, 2022 (last quarterly debt observation before the reverse-repo peak) through the most recent observation of each series. [7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
Start with the bill’s size. The federal government’s total debt reached $39.07 trillion in the first quarter of 2026, up $2.85 trillion in a year and up $7.65 trillion since October 2022.[12] Over that same window, the Federal Reserve did not fund a dollar of it: its balance sheet shrank from $8.55 trillion to $6.74 trillion, and has been roughly flat for the past year.[7] Add the Fed’s $1.81 trillion roll-off to the new debt, and private buyers had roughly $9.5 trillion of Treasury paper to absorb in three and a quarter years.
Who funded the government, October 2022 to Q1 2026
Every dollar was either created, or moved from somewhere else. Here is where it moved from.
THE NEED: ROUGHLY $9.5 TRILLION TO ABSORB
Total debt reached $39.07T in Q1 2026. [12] | ||
The Fed shrank its balance sheet; that paper had to be absorbed too. [7] |
WHERE IT CAME FROM
Savers moved cash in; money-fund assets hit a record $8.29T. [10] | ||
The reverse-repo drain, now finished and at zero since Aug 2025. [8] | ||
Households directly, pensions, banks, and foreign buyers. [10][13] |
Within the foreign slice, the two largest reported holders moved apart: China $0.66T, half its 2011 peak and down 10% in a year; Japan $1.05T and roughly flat. [13]
The printing press does not appear here. The Fed removed money over this window, and M2 growth ran below its 60-year median. The marginal lender to the government is now the American saver, at market rates.
Sources: [7][8][10][12][13] as cited. Money funds hold mostly, not only, Treasury bills and Treasury-backed repo; the split of holders is as reported by each series. Figures are as-of their stated dates and are routinely revised.
Diagnostic reading, not a recommendation. History for context, not a prediction.
The single largest visible funder was the money market fund complex. Its assets stand at a record $8.29 trillion as of the first quarter of 2026: up $3.07 trillion, or 59%, since October 2022, and more than double the $4.00 trillion of late 2019.[10] The retail slice alone, meaning actual household accounts, went from $1.06 trillion to $2.27 trillion over the window, up 114%.[11] That money was not created. It moved: out of low-yield deposits and into funds paying bill rates, for the first sustained stretch since 2007. The saver became the lender.
The second funder was a one-time cushion that has since run out. From late 2022 through mid-2025, money market funds drained $2.55 trillion of cash they had parked overnight at the Federal Reserve and put it to work in Treasury bills.[8] That parking lot, the reverse repo facility, first emptied on August 19, 2025, and has read zero since.[8] Bank reserves, the system’s other buffer, stand at $3.14 trillion, down from a $4.28 trillion peak in late 2021 and drifting 5.6% lower over the past year, now that no cushion sits behind them.[9]
The shock absorber, spent
A $2.55 trillion pile of parked cash, drained into Treasury bills, then gone.
CASH PARKED OVERNIGHT AT THE FED, OVER TIME
| Dec 2022 PEAK |
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| End 2023 |
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| Mid 2024 |
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| Aug 2025 HIT $0 |
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| Now |
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From late 2022 through mid-2025, money funds emptied this $2.55 trillion pile of idle cash and put it to work buying Treasury bills. It first hit zero on August 19, 2025, and has stayed there. [8]
That was a one-time cushion, and it is now spent. The next dollar the government borrows has no parked cash waiting behind it - it has to be raised fresh from savers, at whatever rate wins them over.
Source: [8] Federal Reserve Bank of New York, overnight reverse repo (RRPONTSYD), daily. Interim levels are approximate; the peak and the zero date are exact.
Diagnostic reading, not a recommendation. History for context, not a prediction.
The foreign picture is two-sided. China’s reported Treasury holdings are $0.66 trillion, half their 2011 peak on this series and down 10% in the past year; Japan’s are $1.05 trillion and roughly flat.[13] Two cautions balance that picture: reported figures can understate a country’s true exposure because some holdings are held by custodians elsewhere, and these two series are the largest reported holders, not the foreign total, which is published separately by the Treasury.[13]
Here is the one idea we want every client to hold onto: every dollar that buys a bond has to come from somewhere. It's created or pulled from something else. There is no third source. In 2020 and 2021, the Fed printed trillions, and the money supply, M2, grew by 41%.[6][7] From 2023 to 2025, $2.55 trillion that had been sitting idle at the Fed was shifted into Treasury bills.[8] Both of those engines are now off. What is left is money people have actually saved, and they can currently earn around 3 to 4% in a money-market account or short-term Treasuries, so anyone who wants to borrow it has to beat that. And the government has to win these savers back over and over, because so much of the debt is short-term that the bills come due every few weeks, and the lender has to be talked into staying every single time. That never-ending need to re-attract money is a big part of why the 10-year yield now sits higher than anything the 2010s ever paid.[5] Fear of inflation and the sheer flood of new debt push in the same direction.
The fuel behind the level
Every high valuation rests on a supply of money and credit. That supply can be traced.
Window: 1970 to 2026 for the money-and-economy view; 2021 to July 2026 for the cash buffers; latest reported dates for the holdings tables. [8][9][13][14][15]
Start with how much money is sloshing around, measured against the size of the economy it has to work through. For most of living memory, the two grew together: through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, there was roughly fifty cents of money for every dollar the country produced in a year, and by 2000 that had even slipped a little. Then it broke. The 2008 rescue pushed it up, and the pandemic sent it somewhere it had never been. By 2021, there were 85 cents of money for every dollar of output. It has come down since to about seventy cents, but it never went back to where it had been for the previous forty years. The pool the market swims in got a lot deeper, fast, and it has stayed deep.
For decades, there was about fifty cents of money for every dollar the economy produced. After 2008, and especially after COVID, that jumped - and it has not come back down.
Why groceries, homes, and stocks all got expensive at once
The same flood of money bid up all three.
Here is the idea in one breath. Money has to go somewhere. When the government and the Fed created trillions of new dollars after COVID, that cash did not sit still. It went hunting for things to buy, and there are only so many houses, so many shares of stock, so many goods on the shelf. More dollars chasing the same limited things means one thing: the price of those things goes up. That is why your groceries, your home, and the stock market all got more expensive at the same time.
LOOSE MONEY IN THE SYSTEM, PER $1 THE COUNTRY PRODUCES
| 1970 |
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| 1980 |
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| 1990 |
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| 2000 |
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| 2008 |
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| 2020 |
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| 2021 PEAK |
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| 2026 NOW |
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|
Here is what matters for your money: the flood never drained back out. For decades there was about 50¢ of loose money for every $1 the country made. COVID pushed it to 85¢, the most ever. It has only eased to about 70¢. That extra money is still in the system, still holding prices up - and that includes stock prices.
Technical note: the figures are the M2 money supply divided by one year of GDP (Federal Reserve data via FRED; M2SL monthly, GDP quarterly and annualized). A reading of 0.56 is shown here as 56¢. Red marks the COVID-era readings.
Diagnostic reading, not a recommendation. History for context, not a prediction.
Here is the part that gets our attention. The money that paid for the last few years of government borrowing came from two tanks, and both are running low. One was a giant pool of cash that money funds had parked overnight at the Fed with nowhere better to go, about $2.55 trillion of it. Over the past three years, that pool was steadily emptied into Treasury bills, and today it is gone. The other tank is the reserves banks keep at the Fed, and it has drained from $4.28 trillion to $3.06 trillion. So one source is finished, and the other is a third smaller than it was. The easy money that financed the borrowing has largely been spent.
The two tanks that funded the borrowing are nearly empty: the parked-cash pool is gone, and bank reserves are down by about a third.
The two cash buffers have been drawn down.
What the system had in reserve, then and now.
BANK RESERVES - THE CUSHION BANKS KEEP AT THE FED
| Late 2021 PEAK |
| ||
| Now DOWN A THIRD |
|
CASH PARKED OVERNIGHT AT THE FED - THE SPARE TANK
| Late 2022 PEAK |
| ||
| Now EMPTY |
|
The spare tank is empty and the main cushion is a third smaller. So far the plumbing is still calm: the overnight funding rate (SOFR) is 3.64%, a hair below the 3.65% the Fed pays banks on reserves. If that funding rate climbed and stayed above the reserve rate, that would be the warning light that cash had actually gone scarce.
Sources: bank reserves (FRED WRESBAL, weekly, through July 22, 2026); overnight reverse repo (FRED RRPONTSYD, daily, through July 23; latest about $0.9 billion, effectively zero against a $2.55 trillion peak); SOFR and the interest-on-reserves rate (FRED SOFR and IORB, daily). Bar lengths are scaled to the reserves peak.
Diagnostic reading, not a recommendation. History for context, not a prediction.
So who buys the next bond? For years, a reliable answer was foreign governments, and in total, they are still buying; foreign holdings of Treasuries are actually a little higher than a year ago. But look at who, and the picture is less comforting. The two biggest names on that list, China and Japan, have stopped adding, and China has been trimming. At the same time, the countries that hold the least of their savings in gold have been quietly buying more of it. In plain terms, some of the largest buyers are drifting toward gold and away from the very bonds the government most needs them to keep taking. Nobody is slamming a door, but the enthusiasm is cooling at exactly the wrong moment.
Foreigners are still buying in total, but the biggest names have stopped adding and are drifting toward gold instead.
Who is still buying, and who is rotating out
Foreigners still buy in total, but the biggest names are drifting to gold.
U.S. TREASURIES HELD ABROAD
| Everyone abroad, combined | $9.27T | ▲Up from $8.62T a year ago [14] |
| China | $0.66T | ▼Half its 2011 peak, still trimming [13] |
| Japan | $1.05T | ▬Flat, not adding [13] |
HOW MUCH OF EACH COUNTRY’S SAVINGS IS HELD IN GOLD
| United States |
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| Russia |
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| India |
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| China ROOM TO ADD |
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| Japan ROOM TO ADD |
|
The countries that already hold most of their savings in gold are the rich, established ones. The big emerging buyers - China, Russia, India - hold far less, which means they have the most room to keep adding gold and buying fewer of our bonds. That is the quiet shift: not a sell-off, but the largest players slowly favoring gold over Treasuries.
Sources: total foreign holdings (FRED FDHBFIN, quarterly, through Q4 2025) [14]; China and Japan as previously cited [13]; official gold in tonnes and as a share of total reserves (World Gold Council, from IMF International Financial Statistics, July 2026) [15]. Gold shares move with the gold price and are a position, not a flow.
Diagnostic reading, not a recommendation. History for context, not a prediction.
So here is what the three pictures add up to. The market is priced for a world awash in easy money, but the two things that made money easy - the flood the Fed created, and the parked cash that got moved into bills - are both used up, and the biggest outside buyers are cooling. What is left to hold prices where they are has to be coaxed out of savers who can currently earn around 3 to 4 percent in money-market accounts or short-term Treasuries, and coaxed out of them over and over as the debt rolls. We are not calling a date or predicting a fall. We are saying the support under today’s prices is thinner and more expensive to maintain than it has been in any decade in this data, and that is the honest reason we treat the risk as high.
What this means for a KFSC client invested in the KFSC Risk Managed Strategies
Our goal is to be transparent in our thought process and educate our clients.
The gauges are drawn from the diagnostic layer of our KFSC Macro Intelligence work, a sample of what we analyze as the model diagnoses, not the whole of it. They help us see conditions and historical patterns to make data-driven portfolio decisions. Our strategies may change at any time, based on the risk option you selected, ranging from Preservation of Capital to Aggressive Growth.
What we see in the data provided: participation is broad, and money growth is normal; those are the good readings. The year’s return is above average without being extreme; that is normal. The price of the market, measured two ways, sits at the top of half a century of history, the cost of money is above anything we have seen in the 2010s, the insider dial leans toward selling, and the funding of the government now rests on rate-sensitive savings with the old cushions spent; those are the readings that have our attention.
The liquidity picture is the one we most want clients to sit with, because it sits underneath all the others. The money that lifted asset prices after 2020 is no longer being created or freed up the way it was: the money supply has stopped surging, and the parked cash that quietly funded the government has been spent. What holds prices where they are now has to be drawn from savers who can currently earn around 3 to 4% in money-market accounts or short-term Treasuries - these rates move with Federal Reserve policy and can change, and drawn again every few weeks as short-term debt rolls over. That does not tell us the market will fall, and we are not predicting one. It tells us the support beneath current prices is thinner, and more expensive to maintain, than it has been in decades. That is a condition your advisor weighs against the risk option you have chosen, from Preservation of Capital to Aggressive Growth, not a signal to act on by itself.
Keaney Financial Services Corp does not produce forecasts. We measure, we say what we see, and your advisor decides what, if anything, it means for you.
Models diagnose. Advisors decide. Portfolios implement.
Sources
This commentary was prepared on 07/24/2026. Every data figure traces to a source above. Year-to-date and window computations were performed by Keaney Financial Services Corp directly from the exported series listed here; percentile placements are the share of that series’ own historical observations below the current reading.
Keaney Financial Services Corp does not produce forecasts.
[1] GuruFocus. (2026, July 20). Shiller PE ratio and one-year (trailing) PE ratio, monthly chart data, 1970–2026 [Data export]. Retrieved July 20, 2026, from https://www.gurufocus.com. Cited for: the Shiller PE of 41.1, the one-year PE of 28.5, and the monthly histories behind their placements and medians.
[2] GuruFocus. (2026, July 20). Total US market capitalization as a percent of GDP, with and without Federal Reserve assets, monthly chart data, 1970–2026 [Data export]. Retrieved July 20, 2026, from https://www.gurufocus.com. Cited for: the 234% and 193% readings, their percentile placements, and their series medians.
[3] GuruFocus. (2026, July 20). US insider buy/sell ratio and S&P 500 ETF monthly series, 2004–2026 [Data export]. Retrieved July 20, 2026, from https://www.gurufocus.com. Cited for: the 0.22 insider ratio, its 2004–2026 history, median and low, and the mid-July year ranking of 2026 computed on the monthly index series.
[4] LSEG Workspace. (2026, July 23). S&P 500 (.SPX) and S&P 500 Equal Weight (.EWGSPC) total return indexes, daily, July 19, 2016, to July 23, 2026 [Data exports]. Cited for: all year-to-date, one-year, and ten-year cap-weight versus equal-weight comparisons and the participation gauge.
[5] LSEG Workspace. (2026, July 20). Daily series: gold spot (XAU=), US 10-year benchmark yield (US10YT=RR), dollar index (.DXY), USD/JPY, USD/CHF, 1968 to July 23, 2026 [Data export]. Cited for: the 10-year yield level, its year-to-date change and percentile placement, the 2010s maximum of 3.99%, the gold side of the since-2019 comparison, and the gold, dollar, yen, and franc year-to-date moves.
References [6]–[13] are official statistical sources supporting the funding section; their figures carry as-of dates in the text and are routinely revised by the publishing bodies.
[6] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2026). M2 money stock (M2SL), monthly, seasonally adjusted [Data set]. FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Cited for: the +5.6% growth rate, its percentile, and the long-run median, the 2020–2022 expansion of 41%, the 4.8% contraction, and the May 2025 recovery above the prior peak.
[7] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2026). Total assets of the Federal Reserve (WALCL), weekly [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: the $8.55 trillion to $6.74 trillion path and the flat past year.
[8] Federal Reserve Bank of New York. (2026). Overnight reverse repurchase agreements (RRPONTSYD), daily [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: the $2.55 trillion peak on December 30, 2022, the drain, and the zero readings since August 19, 2025.
[9] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2026). Reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks (WRESBAL), weekly [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: the $3.14 trillion level, the $4.28 trillion 2021 peak, and the one-year decline.
[10] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2026). Money market funds; total financial assets (MMMFFAQ027S), quarterly, Z.1 Financial Accounts [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: the record $8.29 trillion, the +$3.07 trillion window change, and the comparison with late 2019.
[11] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2026). Retail money market funds (WRMFNS), weekly [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: the $1.06 trillion to $2.27 trillion retail path.
[12] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service. (2026). Federal debt: total public debt (GFDEBTN), quarterly [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: the $39.07 trillion level and the one-year and window changes.
[13] U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2026). Treasury International Capital system: foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, China (FORTREASPOS41408) and Japan, long-term (FORLTTREASPOS42609), monthly [Data sets]. FRED. Cited for: China at $0.66 trillion versus a $1.32 trillion 2011 peak and Japan at $1.05 trillion, both as of May 2026.
[14] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service. (2026). Federal debt held by foreign and international investors (FDHBFIN), quarterly [Data set]. FRED. Cited for: total foreign-held Treasuries at $9.27 trillion as of the fourth quarter of 2025, up from $8.62 trillion a year earlier.
[15] World Gold Council. (2026, July). World official gold holdings [Data set, from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics]. Cited for: official gold holdings in tonnes and as a share of total reserves, latest reported dates spring 2026.
Where this commentary describes what other parties expect or intend, those are the stated views of those parties, not of Keaney Financial Services Corp. Keaney Financial Services Corp does not produce forecasts.
1. Compliance Disclosures and Risk Warnings
This commentary is published by Keaney Financial Services Corp for educational and informational purposes only. It is a diagnostic read of the long-run gold price history and the monetary backdrop. It is not investment advice, a recommendation to buy or sell any security, an offer or solicitation, or a guarantee of any outcome. Past performance is not indicative of future results and does not guarantee future returns. All investments involve risk, including the possible loss of principal. Markets can be volatile, and values can fluctuate due to economic, geopolitical, regulatory, and other factors. Readers should consult their own financial, legal, and tax advisors before making investment decisions. Keaney Financial Services Corp and its representatives do not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any third-party data referenced herein.
2. Framework and Risk Management Disclosure
The KFSC Institutional Intelligence System, including its KFSC Macro Regime Model and four diagnostic frameworks (the Monetary Integrity Framework, the Liquidity Transmission Framework, the Strategic Scarcity Framework, and the Market Structure Framework), provides analytical tools used to support advisor decision-making. These tools are not automated systems, do not predict future market outcomes, and do not dictate trades or portfolio actions. All portfolio decisions are made at the sole discretion of the advisor based on their interpretation of available data, client objectives, and prevailing market conditions. Investing involves risk, including political and geopolitical instability, changes in economic and monetary systems, currency fluctuations, market liquidity conditions, and rapid price volatility. These factors may result in significant fluctuations in portfolio value and may not be suitable for all investors. All investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Asset allocation, diversification, and risk management strategies are designed to manage risk but do not guarantee profits or protect against losses.
3. Forward-Looking Statements Disclosure
This commentary contains interpretive analysis of long-run gold prices and the monetary conditions around them, written in clear, everyday language for a general reader. These statements are based on current observations, publicly-reported information, and analytical interpretation. There is no assurance that current conditions will continue or follow any particular path. Any discussion of current conditions reflects interpretive analysis and is not a definitive explanation of causation or a prediction of future results. Keaney Financial Services Corp does not produce forecasts. Where this commentary references forward-looking expectations, those references are intended as interpretive context drawn from publicly reported third-party sources. Forecasting future market data is not part of the firm’s analytical methodology.
4. Allocation and Positioning Disclosure
This commentary is not intended as investment advice for the general public. It is specifically prepared for clients invested in the KFSC Risk Managed Strategies and may not apply to other investments managed by advisors at Keaney Financial Services Corp. outside of these strategies. The KFSC Risk Managed Strategies are discretionary, dynamic, and adaptive. Portfolio positioning, allocations, and exposures may change at any time without notice due to evolving market conditions and the advisor’s judgment. These strategies are implemented across six distinct mandates on a spectrum from Preservation of Capital through Aggressive Growth (Preservation of Capital, Conservative, Conservative Growth, Moderate, Moderate Growth, and Aggressive Growth), each with its own risk profile, volatility expectations, and portfolio construction approach. Suitability of any particular strategy for an individual client is assessed prior to investment. While the macroeconomic themes described in this commentary are derived from the KFSC Institutional Intelligence System and inform the firm’s broader outlook, the specific asset class allocations, position sizes, and underlying holdings may differ materially across strategies, consistent with each strategy’s risk mandate.
5. Methodology and Data Disclosure
The market readings in this commentary are drawn from two kinds of third-party data, each cited in the Sources. Valuation, insider-activity, and index chart series were exported on July 20, 2026, from GuruFocus (gurufocus.com), which compiles them from underlying exchange, company-filing, and government data; index total-return series and the 1968–2026 daily yield, gold, and currency series were exported from LSEG Workspace. Money supply, Federal Reserve balance-sheet, reverse-repurchase, bank-reserve, money-market-fund, federal-debt, and foreign-holdings figures are official statistics of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, retrieved July 20, 2026, through FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). All percentile placements, year-to-date returns, window changes, and rankings were computed by Keaney Financial Services Corp directly from those exported series; a percentile is the share of that series’ own historical observations below the current reading, and each series’ span and frequency are stated in the Sources. Year-to-date returns are total returns, including dividends where labeled. The mid-July year ranking uses monthly index observations and is labeled as such. Different data compilers publish slightly different values for the same concepts; the figures here are as published by the named sources on the retrieval date. All figures are third-party statistics, not measurements of any investment’s return; nothing here describes the return of any account, which would be reduced by fees, transaction costs, and taxes. Keaney Financial Services Corp does not originate underlying market or government data and contextualizes third-party data within the KFSC Macro Regime Model. All data is believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed and may be revised, restated, delayed, or estimated. Produced by Keaney Financial Services Corp., Prepared July 24, 2026.
6. Research, Data, and Technology Disclosure
Research, analysis, and data referenced in this material are developed through the KFSC Institutional Intelligence System, which integrates multiple data sources, analytical inputs, and research processes. These sources may include contributions from non-affiliated third-party providers, such as market data vendors (e.g., LSEG), statistical agencies, central banks, and news organizations. Such sources are believed to be reliable but are not independently verified by Keaney Financial Services Corp. and may be revised. As part of the research and analytical process, advanced computational tools and artificial intelligence systems may be used to assist in organizing, synthesizing, and interpreting data. These tools support analysis within the KFSC Institutional Intelligence System, but they do not independently generate investment recommendations, make investment decisions, or replace the advisor’s judgment. All outputs are subject to human review, interpretation, and oversight. No amount of research, data analysis, or technological support can eliminate the inherent risks of investing or guarantee any specific outcome.
7. Specific Securities Disclosure
This commentary does not name, recommend, or specifically reference any individual security, exchange-traded product, fund, or financial instrument. References to gold are to the metal and its market price as a macroeconomic construct, not to any specific issuer or investment vehicle. Any exposure held in client portfolios is selected based on advisor due diligence and the risk mandate of the specific KFSC Risk Managed Strategies in which the client is invested. No portion of this commentary should be interpreted as a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any specific security or asset.
8. Historical Event Selection and Dataset Disclosure
The information referenced in this material is drawn from the LSEG Workspace gold spot (XAU) series identified in the Sources. The decade patterns and the major drawdowns shown are derived directly from that continuous series; they are descriptive periods within a single series, not discrete events selected for backtesting or trend extrapolation. Past patterns are not a reliable predictor of future patterns. All figures are as of the dates and reference periods specified and are subject to revision as new information becomes available.
9. Statistical Interpretation and Non-Predictive Use Disclosure
All figures presented, including annual price changes, decade cumulative changes, and peak-to-trough drawdowns, are drawn directly from the data identified in the Sources and are provided for descriptive and contextual purposes only. These measures do not represent expected outcomes, imply the probability of recurrence, or constitute forecasts or projections. Keaney Financial Services Corp does not claim that any condition described will continue, reverse, strengthen, or weaken. All forward-looking interpretations remain subject to uncertainty and advisor discretion.
10. Advisor Discretion Statement
All investment decisions are advisor-led and implemented through the applicable KFSC Risk Managed Strategy risk option. Clients select a risk option before investing, and the amount of gold is determined at the strategy/model level. Our advisors do not make individualized gold-position changes for each client within the same strategy model. Advisors may review whether a client’s selected risk option remains appropriate based on risk tolerance, objectives, time horizon, liquidity needs, and changes in financial circumstances. Models diagnose. Advisors decide. Portfolios implement.
11. Business Entity Disclosure
Keaney Financial Services Corp. provides insurance and financial services. Ameritas Investment Company, LLC (AIC), Member FINRA / SIPC, provides securities and investments. Ameritas Advisory Services, LLC (AAS) provides investment advisory services. AIC and AAS are not affiliated with Keaney Financial Services Corp. Ernesto Keaney and Emmelis Keaney are Investment Adviser Representatives of Ameritas Advisory Services, LLC. Accounts are managed on the Ameritas Wealth Platform.
Produced by Keaney Financial Services Corp · July 24, 2026